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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is before the Supreme Court 
based on Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
§78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated. The parties believe that the 
trial court's ruling resolved all issues before it, but, 
alternatively, the trial court certified the ruling for appeal 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review arise out of the question 
of the validity of Salt Lake County's 1984 final May tax sale 
of the subject property. 
The trial court ruled on cross-motions for summary 
judgment. All issues are purely legal conclusions. The 
standard of review on each is, therefore, a review for 
correctness, with no deference accorded the trial court's 
decision, and all facts and inferences therefrom are construed 
in the light most favorable to Appellant. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
More specifically, the issues are as follows: 
1. Did the trial court err in upholding the 1984 tax 
sale by Salt Lake County in the face of Shelledy's claim that 
it was void for lack of jurisdiction because of the immunity of 
the federal government's agency, the Small Business 
Administration (hereinafter SBA). 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that Shelledy's 
claim against the 1984 tax sale was barred by the special 
statutes of limitations? 
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that Shelledy 
lacked standing to dispute the validity of the 1984 tax sale? 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION MAY BE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections: 
78-12-5.1 Seizure or possession within 
seven years — Proviso — Tax title. 
No action for the recovery of real 
property or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained/ unless the plaintiff or his 
predecessor was seized or possessed of such 
property within seven years from the 
commencement of such action; provided, however, 
that with respect to actions or defenses 
brought or interposed for the recovery or 
possession of or to quiet title or determine 
the ownership of real property against the 
holder of a tax title to such property, no such 
action or defense shall be commenced or 
interposed more than four years after the date 
of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer 
creating such tax title unless the person 
commencing or interposing such action or 
defense or his predecessor has actually 
occupied or been in possession of such property 
within four years prior to the commencement or 
interposition of such action or defense or 
within one year from the effective date of this 
amendment. 
78-12-5.2 Holder of tax title 
Limitations of action or defense — Proviso. 
No action or defense for the recovery or 
possession of real property or to quiet title 
or determine the ownership thereof shall be 
commenced or interposed against the holder of a 
tax title after the expiration of four years 
from the date of the sale, conveyance or 
transfer of such tax title to any county, or 
directly to any other purchaser thereof at any 
public or private tax sale and after the 
expiration of one year from the date of this 
act. Provided, however, that this section 
shall not bar any action or defense by the 
owner of the legal title to such property where 
he or his predecessor has actually occupied or 
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been in actual possession of such property 
within four years from the commencement or 
interposition of such action or defense. And 
provided further, that this section shall not 
bar any defense by a city or town, to an action 
by the holder of a tax title, to the effect 
that such city or town holds a lien against 
such property which is equal or superior to the 
claim of the holder of such tax title. 
78-12-5.3 Definitions of "tax title: and 
"action:". 
(1) The terms "tax title" as used in 
§78-12-5.1 and §59-2-1364, and the related 
amended §§78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means 
any title to real property whether valid or 
not, which has been derived through or is 
dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or 
transfer of property in the course of a 
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any 
tax levied against the property whereby the 
property is relieved from a tax lien. 
(2) The word "action" as used in these 
sections includes counterclaims and cross-
complaints and all civil actions wherein 
affirmative relief is sought. 
59-2-1366 Preliminary sale to county. At 
12:00 noon on January 15, all real estate 
subject to a lien for any taxes which are then 
delinquent is considered to have been sold to 
the county at a preliminary sale to pay the 
taxes, penalty, and costs for which the real 
estate is liable. 
59-2-1346 Redemption - Time allowed 
Installments 
(1) Real estate taken over by the county 
for delinquent taxes may be redeemed by any 
person having an interest at any time the 
property is held by the county under 
preliminary tax sale but prior to the day of 
the final tax sale following the lapse of four 
years from the date of preliminary sale. The 
redemption shall be made by the person paying 
into the county treasury the amount due the 
county, all taxes subsequently assessed, and 
all interest, penalty , and costs that have 
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accrued. Property may not be redeemed after 
the expiration of the redemption period 
specified. 
(2) At any time prior to the expiration of 
the period of redemption the county treasurer 
shall accept and credit on account for the 
redemption of property sold for delinquent 
taxes, payments in amounts of not less than 
$10, except for the final payment, which may be 
in any amount. For the purpose of computing 
the amount required for redemption and for the 
purpose of distributing the payments received 
on account, all payments shall be applied in 
the following order: 
(a) against the interest accrued on the 
delinquent tax for the last year included in 
the delinquent account at the time of payment; 
(b) against . the penalty charged on the 
delinquent tax for the last year included in 
the delinquent account at the time of payment; 
(c) against the delinquent tax for the 
last year included in the delinquent account at 
the time of payment; 
(d) against the interest accrued on the 
delinquent tax for the next to last year 
included in the delinquent account at the time 
of payment; 
(e) and so on until the full amount of the 
delinquent tax, penalty, and interest on the 
unpaid balances are paid within the period of 
redemption. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The real property in dispute herein is described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point which is North 660 ft. 
from the Southwest Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of Sec. 29, Township 3 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and meridian, and running 
thence North 220 ft.; thence West 990 ft,; 
thence South 220 ft.; thence East 990 ft. to 
the point of beginning. 
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Subject to a 49.5 ft. right of way for Utah 
Lake Irrigation Co. canal and to a right of way 
over the East portion for 1000 East Street. 
and is situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. R78. 
The Small Business Administration (hereinafter "SBA") 
acquired its interest in and to the above-described real 
property by quit-claim deed dated January 14, 1981, and 
recorded in Book 5246, page 836 as entry number 356 3244 in the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. R78, 86-87. 
At the time the SBA acquired its interest in the 
property, the property had been sold to Salt Lake County at a 
preliminary sale to pay the taxes, penalty and costs for taxes 
due and owing on November 30, 1978, pursuant to §59-2-1336, 
Utah Code Annotated (1988). R79, 87. 
On or before the 1984 May tax sale, the SBA received 
notice by certified mail of the pending tax sale, but did not 
redeem said property. Edward Lore purchased the property from 
Salt Lake County at the May tax sale. R87. 
At the time of the 1984 May tax sale, taxes were due and 
owing for 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983, in the total amount 
of $5,408.63. R87. A tax deed was executed by the Salt Lake 
County Auditor on May 23, 1984, and recorded on August 2, 
1984. R79. The action to quiet title in the plaintiff was 
commenced on or about March 3, 1989. R2. 
Appellant has not occupied the premises which are the 
subject of this action. R88. The property is an undeveloped 
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vacant lot. R140, p. 11 and 12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In 1979, the subject real property was sold to Salt Lake 
County at preliminary tax sale for taxes due and owing in 
1978. On or about May 23, 1984, said property was sold at the 
tax sale to Edward Lore. Prior to said sale, Salt Lake County 
gave notice by certified mail of the pending tax sale to the 
SBA. The SBA purported to own said property by virtue of a 
quit-claim deed executed and recorded in 1981. Despite notice 
of the pending tax sale, the SBA failed to redeem said property0 
Salt Lake County asserts that this action is barred by 
the statute of limitations; that the sovereign immunity of the 
United States does not protect Appellant; that the SBA acquired 
from its grantors, a statutory right of redemption which it 
failed to exercise. Having failed to exercise the state 
created statutory right, the SBA's right to redeem was 
extinguished by the May tax sale. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S ACTION IS BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The tax deed was executed by the Salt Lake County Auditor 
on May 23, 1984 and recorded on August 2, 1984. Appellant's 
action was commenced on or about March 10, 1989, beyond the 
statutory period provided in §78-12-5.1 and §78-12-5.2, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) (1988) (hereinafter "special statute of 
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limitations") and thus is time barred. Hansen v. Morris, 293 
P.2d 884 (Utah 1955); Frederiksen v. LaFluer, 632 P.2d 827 
(Utah 1981); Kemmerer Coal Company v. Briqham Young University, 
723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983). 
In Hansen v. Morris, the defendants asserted that the 
plaintiff, tax sale purchaser, had failed to prove that all 
statutory steps incident to the tax sale had occurred and hence 
the purchaser did not have valid title. The Court noted that 
no claim had been made that the deed was void on its face or 
that it was not issued by the proper governmental authority. 
In upholding the constitutionality of the special statute 
of limitations applicable to tax sales, the Court rejected the 
argument that the statute of limitations barring challenges to 
tax sale deeds should be construed differently than other 
statutes of limitations, which validate certain conveyances by 
virtue of the passage of time. The court stated as follows: 
In holding such sections valid, we can see 
no merit in any argument to the effect that if 
any of the statutory steps necessary to perfect 
a tax title have not been taken, such as 
failure to give notice of sale, failure of the 
auditor to execute affidavits, etc., compels 
the conclusion that title remains in the record 
owner, hence no title passes, hence any claim 
by the county and/or its grantee by tax deed is 
invalid, hence the statute of limitations does 
not apply. The same argument could be leveled 
against other statutes of limitations where the 
authorities have validated a situation where 
one becomes the owner absolute of the property 
of another, without conveyance of any kind, but 
merely as an adjunct of the passage of time and 
the performance of statutorily prescribed 
conditions. The same argument also could be 
leveled against the so-called prima facie 
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statutes which legitimize such shifting of 
unconveyed title by permitting certain 
documents to establish, prima facie, facts 
therein recited or the regularity of 
proceedings theretofore had, where such prima 
facie evidence is either not attacked or 
survives an attack, even though later it 
develops that occurrences prior to the 
adduction of such evidence have prevented such 
shifting of title had they been urged before 
such evidence was adduced. 
293 P.2d at 886. 
Since the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Hansen v. 
Morris, the Court has addressed the application of the statute 
of limitations to tax sales in two cases, Frederiksen v. 
LaFluer, and Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982). With 
respect to the special statute of limitations, in Frederiksen 
v. LaFluer, the Court upheld its validity: 
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 bar 
actions or defenses against "the holder of a 
tax title." Section 78-12-5.3 defines "tax 
title" as "any title to real property, whether 
valid or not," derived from a tax sale. Our 
Legislature could hardly have expressed itself 
more clearly. This Court has often cited and 
applied §78-12-5o3 to permit holders of invalid 
or questionable tax titles to claim protection 
under the special limitations statute. Kanawha 
and Hocking Coal and Coke Company v. Carbon 
County, supra (tax title assumed invalid); 
Layton v. Holt, supra (tax title alleged 
invalid due to county auditor's failure to 
attach affidavit to assessment roll); Peterson 
v. Callister, supra (tax title "technically may 
not have passed" due to county's failure to 
follow various statutory steps); Hansen v. 
Morris, supra (tax title not perfected due to 
failure to comply with necessary statutory 
steps) . We see no reason to depart from these 
precedents or to reject the plain meaning of 
the statute. 
632 P.2d at 831. 
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Further, notwithstanding the fact the tax sale 
proceedings rendered the deed invalid the action was 
nonetheless barred by the statute of limitations. In footnote 
14 at page 831, the Court in Frederiksen v. LaFleur reserved 
its opinion on the application of the special statute of 
limitations where the tax title is acquired by ".•.means 
repugnant to fundamental fairness or whether such an 
application of the statute would exceed the limits of statutory 
intent or constitutional permissability." 
In Dillman v. Foster, a tax title purchaser, who was the 
former record title holder, attempted to defeat the title of a 
party who was his own successor grantee by urging the 
application of the statute of limitations. The Court would not 
permit a tax title purchaser to strengthen his title to 
property by buying at tax sale when the property was sold as a 
consequence of his omission to pay taxes. State and Local 
Taxation 72 AmJur.2d §941. 
Although this court has not addressed the subject on 
which it reserved its opinion as noted in footnote 14 of 
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered it in Kemmerer Coal Co. v. Brigham Young 
University. In applying Frederiksen, the Court of Appeals held 
that a due process challenge to the validity of the tax sale, 
which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations 
was not a violation of the Frederiksen standard. The court 
held it was not "fundamentally unfair" to apply the statute of 
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limitations to the purchaser from the record title holder "in 
the face of record notice of a rival claim.. ." Kemmerer Coal 
Co. v. Briqham Young University, 723 F.2d at 58. 
As in Kemmerer, the only possible constitutional claim is 
that Shelledy's predecessor in interest had its rights violated 
by the tax sale. But Shelledy also had notice of the rival 
claim to the property by virtue of the 1984 tax deed. Under 
the Tenth Circuit's analysis, Shelledy's claim sould also be 
barred. 
POINT II 
EVEN THOUGH THE TAX SALE MAY HAVE BEEN 
INVALID THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
BARS THIS ACTION 
The Appellant has never contended that the 1984 tax deed 
was void on its face. Shelledy claims the deed is void because 
the SBA's interest in the property remov€*d the property from 
the County's taxing jurisdiction. His argument is that any 
sale of the property for taxes would be void; if a tax sale is 
void the statute of limitations will not run. However, 
Shelledy's contention is not supported by the authorities he 
relies upon and is not the law in Utah. 
The Appellant contends that Hansen v. Morris, supports 
his argument that the statute of limitations will not run if a 
deed is void for lack of jurisdiction. In Hansen v. Morris, 
the Court held that the statute of limitations will not run if 
the deed is void on its face. It also held that the statute 
will run if the tax deed is valid on its face and issued by the 
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proper governmental authority: 
In passing, we do not wish it understood 
that our decision is applicable to conveyances 
void on their face, such as those containing no 
grantor, grantee, description, etc., or to 
those that may be forged or the like, but only 
to those valid on their face, as here, and 
executed by the same authority that could have 
passed good title if each and every statutory 
step in perfecting a tax title had been 
followed, without the aid of limitations 
statute.^-2 (emphasis added) 
283 P.2d at 887. 
None of the cases cited in the footnote 12 address the 
issue raised by the Appellant and the statute of limitations 
was held in each case to bar the action. Jones v. Russell, 194 
So. 290 (Miss. 1940) (two year statute of limitations is 
intended to cut off inquiry into the merits of the validity of 
the tax sale); Strauss v. Thompson, 71 P.2d 994 (Okla. 1935) 
(action to cancel tax deed which was not void on its face is 
barred by the one year statute of limitations); Eagles v. 
General Electric Company, 104 P.2d 912 (Wash. 1940) (the 
statute of limitations will run even though a deed is void). 
Further Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation, 783 
P.2d 1045 (Ut.App. 1989), cert, denied 133 U.A.R. 18 (Utah 
1990), does not support his position either. In Baxter the 
issue before the Court was whether the property which had been 
sold at tax sale was situated in Davis or Weber County. It was 
contended that the tax deed from Davis County was void because 
the property was located in Weber County and as a result Davis 
-11-
County "had no authority to tax the property, to acquire title 
when taxes were unpaid, or to convey title through a tax 
deed." Baxter, 783 P.2d 1045, 1047. 
Clearly Baxter is wholly inapplicable. Davis County 
could not convey a valid title through tax sale to property 
situated in another county. A statute of limitations defense 
in Baxter would have failed under the standard articulated by 
the Court in Hansen and Frederiksen. 
Appellant asserts that a leading authority in real 
property contends "the statute of limitations is without 
application to void deeds." Vol. 5B Thompson, Real Property, 
§2766 (1978). The above quote is footnoted with reference to 
several cases. Those cases reveal that the scope of the 
assertion is primarily limited to deeds void on their face. 
Pierce v. Barrett, 220 P. 652 (Okla. 1923); Adams v. Mottley, 
223 P. 356 (Okla. 1924) (tax deed defective on its face is not 
sufficient to set statute of limitations in operation); Loper 
v. E.W. Gates Lbr. Co., 98 S. 722 (Ala. 1923) (statute of 
limitations inapplicable to tax sale where owner paid taxes 
before sale); Goodrich v. Parr, 256 S.W. 868 (Ark. 1923) (tax 
deed void due to defect on face of deed hence statute of 
limitations does not run); Harana v. Gheens Realty Co., 98 S. 
812 (La. 1923) (statute of limitations does not run against tax 
deeds which did not include property within tax deed 
description). 
Appellant refers to P. Lear, Utah's Short Statutes of 
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Limitations for Tax Titles: The Continuing Specter of Lvman v. 
National Mortgage Bond Corp,, — A Need for Remedial 
Legislation, 76 BYU L.Rev. 457, 467 (1976) for authority that 
where a deed is void due to jurisdictional defect the statute 
of limitations favoring tax deeds do not run. Appellant has 
misinterpreted Lear's statement which is set forth in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Special or short statutes of limitation do 
not run where the tax deed is absolutely void 
on its face—not merely voidable—due to some 
jurisdictional defect or where the 
jurisdictional defect, not apparent on the face 
of the deed, entails an irregularity in the 
proceedings... 
...In most states, however, where the deed 
is valid on its face and is voidable merely for 
some irregularity in the proceedings, the 
limiting statute runs from the date of 
execution and delivery of the deed or, in some 
cases, from the date of recording, regardless 
of possession. 
P. Lear, Ibid., p. 468. 
Lear identified examples of jurisdictional defects as 
follows: 
48. Bird v. Benlisa, 142 U.S. 664 (1892); 
Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884 
(1955). Examples of jurisdictional defects 
include situations in which (1) the land sold 
at the tax sale was not subject to taxation: 
(2) the land sold was not subject to the taxes 
for which it was sold, Mecham v. Mel-O-Tone 
Enterprises, 23 Utah 2d 403, 464 P.2d 392 
(1970); (3) taxes for which the land was sold 
were never assessed, Huntington City v. 
Peterson, 30 Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246 (1974); 
(4) the assessment was void, Keller v. 
Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318 (1943); 
and (5) the taxes had been paid, and there had 
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been an incorrect duplicate assessment, Cameron 
Estates, Inc. v. Deering, 308 N.Y. 24, 123 
N.E.2d 621 (1954). (Emphasis added) 
P. Lear, Ibid at 467. 
The statute of limitations will run, even though the tax 
deed is voidable due to a jurisdictional desfect such as alleged 
by Appellant. This court specifically adopted this reasoning 
in Hansen v. Morris and in Frederiksen v. LaFluer, when it held 
that the statute of limitations would bar a challenge to the 
tax deed even though the tax deed was invalid. 
In conclusion, neither Hansen v. Morris, Baxter v. Davis 
County, nor the scholarly authorities support the Appellant's 
argument that the deed is void. The deed is valid on its face 
and issued by Salt Lake County which had taxing jurisdiction 
over the subject property. 
POINT III 
THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED 
STATES IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE 
Despite Appellant's representations, he is asserting the 
constitutional rights of the United States when he raises 
sovereign immunity as a basis to void the tax sale by Salt Lake 
County. The doctrine of sovereign immunity arises from the 
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl.2. United 
States v. New Mexico, 71 L.Ed.2d 580, 102 S.Ct. 1373 (1982). 
Appellant has cited several cases in support of his 
assertion in Point V of his brief that he has standing to raise 
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the issue of the validity of the tax deed. Salt Lake County 
contends the Appellant lacks standing to assert the sovereign 
immunity of the United States to invalidate the deed in the 
context of the statute of limitations defense. 
This contention arises from the decision of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Kemmerer Coal Co. v. Brigham Young 
University, wherein the court held that the Kemmerer Coal 
Company had no standing to assert the violation of the 
constitutional rights of its grantor as a basis to void a tax 
sale otherwise barred for lack of timeliness by the statute of 
limitations. 
Kemmerer Coal Company asserted that the due process 
rights of its grantor, San Rafael had been violated by the 
County because San Rafael received no notice of the tax 
assessment and received only publication notice of the sale of 
the coal rights. This notice listed strangers to the title as 
owners. The court acknowledged that San Rafael's due process 
rights may have been violated by Emery County. Kemmerer 
asserted that the statute of limitations did not bar the due 
process attack on the title derived from the tax deed grantee 
because the tax title was void for lack of due process. The 
court rejected that argument and stated its reasoning as 
follows: 
...Kemmerer itself has suffered no due 
process injury. If a constitutional violation 
occurred, it was the taking of San Rafael's 
property without due process. Kemmerer thus 
seeks to advance its claim by asserting a 
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third-party's constitutional rights. M[T]he 
general rule is that a litigant may only 
assert his own constitutional rights or 
immunities." (citations omitted) 
*** 
We believe the Utah Supreme Court would 
hold that Kemmerer has no standing to assert a 
third-party's constitutional rights under the 
facts of this case. While it may have been 
"repugnant to fundamental fairness," 
Frederiksen, 632 P.2d at 831 n. 14, to deprive 
San Rafael of its property without proper 
notice, we do not believe it fundamentally 
unfair to apply the statute of limitations to 
Kemmerer who bought the coal lands in the face 
of record notice of a rival claim to 
"underground rights." 
723 F.2d at 57-58. 
Similarly, it is not fundamentally unfair or in excess of 
constitutional permissability to apply the statute of 
limitations to bar Appellant's quiet title action when 
Appellant asserts an immunity solely that of the United States 
and when on notice of a rival claim due to a 1984 tax sale deed. 
None of the cases cited by appellant in support if its 
claim to standing involve challenges to the validity of a tax 
deed when the statute of limitations has been raised as a 
defense. Further, the case of Daniel v. Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736 
(Fla. 1950), cited by Appellant, involved the defense of 
estoppel raised by the tax deed purchasers against the State of 
Florida. The State had succeeded to the interest of the United 
States in certain property which the State had previously sold 
at tax sale at a time it was held by the United States. The 
-16-
court held the state was estopped from asserting the invalidity 
of its own sale on grounds of equity and was barred by its own 
tax sale documents which purported to convey title to the 
property. Notably the statute of limitations had not been 
raised as a defense. 
Even if this court were to find Shelledy could assert the 
sovereign immunity of the United States, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is not without limit. United States v. New 
Mexico, 71 L.Ed.2d 580. Under the circumstances of this case, 
the doctrine does not apply. 
In State and Local Taxation, 71 AmJur. 2d §224, a general 
discussion of sovereign immunity is set forth in pertinent part 
as follows: 
The principle which prevents a state from 
levying a tax which will curtail in any 
substantial manner the exercise of the powers 
of the Federal Government has its inherent 
limitations. Its application must be practical 
and have regard for the circumstances 
disclosed. The end sought to be attained is 
important. The immunity is for the protection 
of the government, and extends no further than 
is necessary for that purpose. It does not 
extend to anything lying outside or beyond 
governmental functions and their exertion. It 
does not exist where no direct burden is laid 
upon the governmental instrumentality and there 
is only a remote, if any, influence upon the 
exercise of the functions of the government, 
[citations omitted]. 
Shelledy has failed to prove any direct burden on the 
government or influence on the exercise of the function of the 
government. He asserts that to deprive a grantee of property 
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received from the United States would constitute a taking of 
property from the federal government since the government would 
not be able to alienate marketable property. The fact property 
may be less marketable is not the burden intended to cause 
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Northside 
Canal Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 8 F.2d 73 9 (Wyo. 
1925). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that property 
purchased by a private person from the federal government 
becomes a part of the general mass of property in the state and 
must bear its fair share of the expenses of local government, 
even though the prospect of taxation by the state may reduce 
the amount that the United States might receive from the sale 
of its property* Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 
U.S. 342, 93 L.Ed. 721 (1948). 
Thus Shelledy can not assert a burden which was not borne 
by the United States as a reason to cloak him with the 
sovereign immunity of the United States. The burden if any is 
remote. Because it is remote, sovereign immunity does not 
protect him. 
The Appellant further asserts that the statute of 
limitations could not commence to run while the title to the 
property was in the Small Business Administration and thus this 
action is not barred by the defense of the statute of 
limitations. 
As a general rule, the statute of limitations does not 
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run against the sovereign. Limitation of Actions, 51 AmJur.2d 
§409. However where the government has no real interest in the 
litigation, the defense of the statute of limitations is 
available the same as if the litigation were between 
individuals. Limitations of Actions, 51 AmJur.2d §410. Thus 
even if the United States were a nominal party and this action 
brought in its name, if the United States has no real interest 
in the litigation and the benefit to come from the litigation 
will inure to the benefit of an individual such as Shelledy, 
the statute of limitations may be asserted as a defense to the 
suit. McNutt v. Cox, 129 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. 1930); Limitations 
of Actions , 51 AmJur.2d §410. 
The Appellant has failed to cite any cases which support 
his position that the statute of limitations is not a valid bar 
to his claim even though the grantor was the United States. 
Clearly the Appellant and not the United States is the real 
party in interest. A real party in interest is one who has the 
right to control and receive the fruits of the litigation. 
Preston v. Iron County, 314 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Wis.App. 1981). 
If Appellant prevails the appellant will have set aside the tax 
deed issued by Salt Lake County and will quiet title in 
himself. Under such circumstances, the fact the United States 
may have been in the chain of title does not affect the running 
of the statute of limitations as it applies to the Appellant's 
claim. 
Further, the interest of the SBA in the property was the 
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right to exercise the state created statutory right of 
redemption. Where an action is brought under a state statute 
which creates a right which did not exist at common law, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity will not apply. Limitation of 
Actions, §51 AmJur.2d §414. Thompson v. Avery, 39 P. 829 (Utah 
1895) . 
POINT IV 
THE 1984 MAY TAX SALE WAS VALID 
Utah law provides two statutory methods by which 
delinquent real property taxes may be collected by the taxing 
authority.. One is a summary administrative tax sale proceeding 
in the nature of forfeiture and the other is a judicial 
foreclosure of the tax liens. Initially once taxes become 
delinquent two events occur; a lien attaches as of January 1 of 
each year (§59-2-1325) and all real estate subject to a lien 
for delinquent taxes is considered to have been sold to the 
County at a preliminary sale on January 15 (§59-2-1336), 
The summary administrative proceedings arise from the 
preliminary sale of the property to the County. Once a 
preliminary sale occurs, the treasurer is required to make a 
record of the property sold, including a description of the 
tract sold (§59-2-1338(1) (b)); and the amount for which the 
property was sold at preliminary tax sale (§59-2-1338(1)(c)). 
On or before March 31 the treasurer is then required to 
certify the record of the preliminary tax sale 
-20-
(§59-2-1339(1)). The record is the official tax sale record 
and is maintained in the treasurer's office (§59-2-1339(2)). 
If property is not redeemed by March 31 following the 
lapse of four years from the date of the preliminary tax sale, 
the property is listed for the "Final May Tax Sale" 
(§59-2-1343). 
Real estate taken over by the County for delinquent taxes 
may be redeemed by any person having an interest at any time 
the property is held by the County under preliminary sale but 
prior to the day of the final tax sale (§59-2-1346(1)). 
Upon receiving the Final May Tax Sale listing from the 
treasurer, the auditor shall advertise all real estate sold at 
preliminary sale and not previously redeemed and upon which the 
period of redemption is expiring (§59-2-1351). 
Thereafter the auditor executes a deed conveying in the 
sale all property sold at the public sale to the purchaser 
(§59-2-1352(1-6)). 
An entirely separate remedy is set forth in §59-2-1353 
wherein the County may foreclose its lien by an action in the 
District Court. The foreclosure remedy is an additional remedy 
and may not deprive the County of any other method or means 
provided for the collection or enforcement of any taxes. 
(§59-2-1358). 
Appellant's interest is founded upon a quit-claim deed 
from the SBA, which founded its interest upon a quit-claim deed 
received from Clair R. And Virginia S. Pearson. "Such deeds do 
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not imply the conveyance of any particular interest in the 
property...Plaintiffs acquired only the interest of their 
grantors, be that interest what it may." Nix v. Tooele County, 
118 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1941). 
At the time of the conveyance to the SBA, the Pearson's 
transferred their statutory right to redeem the property which 
had been sold at preliminary tax sale to Salt Lake County. The 
right of redemption afforded the grantors is a statutory right 
pursuant to §59-2-1346, which amended §59-10-56. MThe right of 
redemption is not personal to the owner at the time of the tax 
sale; while it is not an estate in land, it is a statutory 
privilege which passes to the heir of the owner in the same 
manner as the land itself." State and Local Taxation, 72 
AmJur.2d §999; Belmore v. State Tax Commission, 245 Po2d 149 
(N.M. 1952); Yates v. Hawkins, 126 P.2d 476 (N.M. 1926) . The 
statutory right to redeem is not considered a vested property 
right. Jackson v. Hartley, 564 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1977). A 
quit-claim deed may pass a right to redeem property sold for 
delinquent taxes. Deeds, 23 AmJur.2d §339; Bateman v. Donovan, 
131 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1942). 
In Belmore v. State Tax Commission, the court held that a 
quit-claim deed executed after the tax deed to the state had 
been executed and delivered did not convey title because title 
was in the state by virtue of the tax deed issued by the 
County. The quit-claim deed did convey the statutory right of 
redemption held by the grantor. 
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The court in Belmore further held that the quit-claim 
deed was void as a conveyance of title because it was executed 
and delivered subsequent to the conveyance by tax deed to the 
state of the lots in question. 
Thus the conveyance by quit-claim deed from the Pearsons 
to the SBA transferred their statutory right of redemption. 
The SBA did not exercise the right of redemption and thus lost 
the statutory right by its failure. Rushton v. Saoe Land 
Company, 583 P.2d 76 (Utah 1978). The fact the grantee was the 
Small Business Administration does not create a greater 
interest in the property than that which its grantor had. Nix 
v. Tooele County. 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the 
status of a county's tax lien following transfer of the 
property to a sovereign entity. In State v. Salt Lake County, 
85 P. 2d 851 (Utah 1938), the mortgagor borrowed money from the 
State of Utah in 1924 and mortgaged the land as security for 
payment. Subsequently, the mortgagor defaulted in his payments 
and when faced with foreclosure, executed a warranty deed 
conveying the mortgaged property to the State on December 16, 
1936. Meanwhile, the property was assessed and sold for taxes 
in 1932 to Salt Lake County. Taxes for 1933 through 1936 
accrued and, upon failure to redeem and notwithstanding record 
title in the State of Utah, the County Auditor deeded the 
property on April 15, 1937 to the County in satisfaction of the 
taxes. The State brought suit to quiet title to the property 
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in itself. In dismissing the State's complaint to quiet title, 
the Court wrote as follows: 
If the taxes for 1932 to 1936 inclusive 
were lawfully levied against this property as 
that of [the mortgagor], and we have so held, 
then by what process of reasoning can they be 
adjudged unlawful after and solely because the 
State obtained a deed for the property from 
[the mortgagor] on December 16, 1936, in 
satisfaction of its mortgage? The State by 
that deed could acquire only such title as its 
grantor had at the time of the deed; that is, a 
title encumbered by taxes theretofore lawfully 
assessed and levied, and by prior tax sales, if 
any. 
85 P.2d at 854. 
By its decision in State v. Salt Lake County, this Court 
has recognized that the County may issue a valid tax deed 
notwithstanding the fact a sovereign entity holds record title 
thereto if the tax delinquencies exist prior to the sovereign's 
acquisition of title. Further the decision stands for the 
proposition that the statutory right of redemption will run 
against the sovereign as wello 
The SBA could only acquire the interest of the grantor 
pursuant to the quit-claim deed. Prior to the execution of the 
quit-claim deed in 1981, the property had been sold for taxes 
in 1979 to Salt Lake County, subject to the statutory right of 
redemption. After the preliminary sale to the County the 
grantor had the right to redeem by paying the delinquent 
taxes * Thus the SBA acquired a right to redeem the property 
and once it failed to do so, its statutory right to redeem the 
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property was extinguished, Rushton v. Sage Land Co. 
In United States v. Mever, 199 F.Supp. 508 (S.D.Ill.S.D. 
1961), the United States filed federal tax liens against real 
property after the preliminary sale of the property for 
delinquent taxes but before a tax deed had been issued. The 
United States failed to redeem the property during the 
statutory two year period of redemption and a tax deed was 
issued. In rejecting the United States assertion that it's 
liens preceded that of the tax deed purchaser, the court stated 
as follows: 
...the interest of the United States in 
and to described property, became no greater 
than the interest of the Hartman's which, under 
the law of the State of Illinois, was a right 
to redeem from the state tax sale,...and 
the...United States, having failed to redeem 
within the two year statutory and Illinois 
constitutional period, defendant Paul Meyer 
became the owner of the real estate.... 
199 F.Supp. at 509-510. 
Likewise the SBA had the opportunity to redeem prior to 
the tax sale and elected not to do so. Once the tax deed was 
issued, the statutory right to redeem ceased to exist. Where 
an owner of land or anyone who has a right to take his place, 
including the United States, lets the period of redemption 
expire, it does so at his own peril. United States v. Meyer. 
In summary, because the statutory right of redemption is 
not a vested property right, sovereign immunity does not 
prevent the running of the statutory period for exercising that 
right. 
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When the SBA failed to exercise the right of redemption 
it acquired from the grantors, the property was properly sold 
by the County* 
CONCLUSION 
The special statute of limitations bars this action to 
quiet title, which was commenced more than four years after the 
execution of the tax deed pursuant to the 1984 May tax sale 
conducted by Salt Lake County. The statute will run even if 
the deed may be invalid or voidable due to some jurisdictional 
defect or irregularity in the proceedings. Further, because 
the jurisdictional defect asserted by the Appellant is due to 
the interest of the SBA in the subject property, the Appellant 
lacks standing to assert this defect. At the time the 
Appellant received a quit-claim deed from the SBA, its 
interest, which was the statutory right of redemption, had been 
extinguished due to the SBA's failure to redeemc Thus the 1984 
May tax sale was valid as against the SBA8 grantee. 
Respondent Salt Lake County respectfully requests the 
Court uphold the decision of the trial court in its entirety. 
DATED this / V^ day of July, 1990. 
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